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In 1933 America decisively ended its ill-fated experiment in national 
prohibition by enacting the Twenty-first Amendment. This article tells the 
tale of America’s return to liquor from a legal perspective. It recounts the 
ebb and flow of the prohibitionist movements in the nineteenth century, the 
congressional debates over the Twenty-first Amendment, the state laws, 
popular votes, and constitutional conventions that followed, and the state 
liquor regulatory systems adopted afterwards. A legal approach to 
prohibition illuminates intriguing, largely overlooked topics, including the 
constitutional questions activated by Congress’s unprecedented decision to 
submit the amendment to state conventions rather than legislatures. It is also 
a window to one of America’s most democratic moments.   
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In 1933 America decisively ended its thirteen year experiment with 
national Prohibition. Much has been written about Prohibition’s explosive 
fall from grace. Historians have identified the social, political, and moral 
forces that shaped the prohibitionist movement in the late 1800s and early 
1900s, the popular sentiment that led to widespread civil disobedience in 
the 1920s, and the fervor for personal liberty that brought the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s downfall. The traditional account reveals a rich history and a 
captivating story. 
This article approaches that history from a legal perspective, which 
focuses on the laws, legal debates, votes, and the politics that ended the 
Eighteenth Amendment. A legal approach sheds light on largely overlooked 
aspects of Prohibition. For example, the congressional debates contribute to 
the simmering questions of federalism that plague American liquor laws 
today. Also, Congress’s decision to submit the Amendment to conventions 
rather than legislatures – an unprecedented choice – led to an 
extraordinarily democratic ratification where millions of Americans, 
including women, registered their votes. Ratification by conventions also 
raised intriguing constitutional questions that remain unanswered. 
Part I supplies a brief history of alcohol regulation in the United 
States, drawn mostly from secondary sources and newspaper articles at the 
time. Waves of prohibition sentiment ebbed and flowed in the nineteenth 
century. In 1851, Maine became the first state to outlaw alcohol entirely.1 
Over the next several years, twelve more states followed suit.2 By the mid 
1860s, however, partly due to adverse state court decisions, the number of 
prohibition states dwindled.3 In 1869 states re-mounted the prohibition 
bandwagon, but by 1904 “only three prohibition states remained.”4 Ten 
years later the pendulum swung again and by 1919 “33 States had adopted 
or enacted legislation prohibiting to some degree the sale or manufacture of 
alcoholic beverages.”5 That year also saw the ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, which inaugurated the National Prohibition era. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, State Liquor Legislation 3 (1940). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 5. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 6. 
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Part II turns to the 1933 congressional debates over the Twenty-first 
Amendment. Some discussion in Congress dealt with Section 2 of the 
Amendment, which prohibited “[t]he transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use there 
in of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof.”6 Section 2 was 
designed to return to the states the power to regulate alcohol within their 
borders.  The larger question, however, was whether Section 2 would 
authorize state laws that would otherwise violate other constitutional 
provisions. That question passed beneath the congressional radar. What 
little discussion there was shows that the Twenty-first Amendment was 
intended to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, which had 
allowed dry states to prohibit the importation of alcohol. Congressmen also 
discussed the mode of ratification. For the first time, Congress chose to 
submit a constitutional amendment to popular state conventions rather than 
state legislatures. As I will show, that choice raised constitutional questions 
that Americans did not answer in 1933. 
Part III looks at the aftermath of Congress’s vote on the Twenty-first 
Amendment. State legislatures passed special laws holding special popular 
votes and establishing special conventions. Dozens of states held elections 
for convention delegates, creating robust public debate. The convention 
delegates abided by the election results, making the conventions themselves 
mere formalities. The Twenty-first Amendment, therefore, was the most 
democratically enacted constitutional amendment since the Founding.  
 Part IV concludes by examining the states’ reactions to the Twenty-
first Amendment. Most established strict three-tier distribution and 
licensing systems designed to separate producers, wholesalers, and retailers. 
These regulatory regimes still survive today. The state prohibition laws that 
had dotted the country in 1919, however, did not return. Only three states 
reenacted bone dry prohibition laws. 
 
I. DEMON RUM 1851-1933: A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE LIQUOR LAWS 
 
Early America had a schizophrenic relationship with liquor. Newspapers 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries excoriated “demon 
rum.” A popular poem, printed in the Hartford Gazette in 1794, read in part: 
 How happy is the man, 
                                                 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
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 Who has a quiet home, 
 Who loves to do what good he can, 
 And hates the demon rum . . .7 
Religious leaders, especially Protestants, believed that “intemperance 
seriously interfered with their soul-saving mission because it destroyed 
man’s health, impaired his reason, and distracted him from the love of 
God.”8 But Americans by and large did not listen to such appeals. The 
period from 1800 – 1830 saw more per capita consumption of alcohol “than 
at any other time in the history of the nation.”9 Americans imbibed 
enormous quantities of alcohol, at breakfast, lunch, dinner, and in between. 
Babies’ “bottles were laced with rum to keep them ‘pacified’; later, ‘able 
bodied men, and women, too, for that matter, seldom went more than few 
hours with a drink.’”10 
America’s love affair with liquor prompted the emergence of a 
strong, well organized temperance movement, with roots stretching back to 
the 1600s. At first, temperance advocates implored people to pledge to 
abstain from liquor.11 When persuasion proved unsuccessful, the 
temperance movement urged state legislatures to prohibit the manufacture 
and sale of alcohol. In 1851, Maine became the first state to oblige, 
outlawing the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, allowing an 
exception only for medicinal reasons. The Maine law provided a penalty of 
“ten dollars and the costs of prosecution” for a first offense, “twenty dollars 
and the costs of prosecution” for a second offense, and between three and 
six months imprisonment for third and subsequent offenses.12 Neal Dow, 
Maine’s unflinching champion of prohibition, declared: “We are gradually 
contracting the area within which we have the rum traffic enclosed; and, in 
good time, we will exterminate it all.”13 Dow’s prediction was wrong. 
Though Maine’s experiment with liquor prohibition triggered copycat 
liquor control statutes in twelve more states, by the late 1850s all state 
                                                 
7 The Happy Man, Hartford Gazette, Aug. 21, 1794, Vol. 1, Issue 64, p. 4 
8 DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION at 6 (2d ed. 2000). 
9 THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM, THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA 1800-
1933, at 7 (1998). 
10 EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 7 (1996). 
11 See KYVIG, supra note 8, at 6.  
12 An Act for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops, Maine Rev. Stat. 
Chap. 211 (June 2, 1851). 
13 Liquor Law in Maine, New Hampshire Sentinel, Sept. 25, 1851, Vol. LIII, Issue 39, Page 
2.  
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prohibition statutes, including Maine’s, had been repealed or were not 
enforced.14 
The Civil War distracted the temperance movement for a decade, 
but by 1869 the drys had regained their momentum. That year saw the 
formation of the Prohibition Party, and in 1873 the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU) also sprang into being.15 Decades later, the 
WCTU would play a leading role in building the Prohibition Amendment 
into the nation’s higher law. But in the late nineteenth century 
prohibitionists concentrated their efforts locally. States began to re-mount 
the prohibition bandwagon. By 1890 “sixteen more states – Ohio, Maine, 
Rhode Island, Michigan, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Nebraska – [had] voted on prohibition 
amendments.”16 In 1895, the Anti-Saloon League was formed, which 
rapidly became the standard bearer for the prohibitionist cause. 
But the rising number of prohibition states encountered a roadblock. 
Though formally dry, the prohibition states could not prevent alcohol from 
entering their borders from out-of-state. Because of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, which prohibits states from interfering with interstate commerce, 
dry states were powerless to erect legal barriers to the importation of 
alcohol from out-of-state. If the states were to maintain effective liquor 
laws, it was up to the federal government to intervene, and so it did.17 In 
1890 Congress passed the Wilson Act, which allowed states to regulate 
imported liquor “upon arrival” in the state “to the same extent and in the 
same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced” within 
the state.18 The evident purpose of the Wilson Act was to allow dry states to 
police their borders effectively. At the same time, the Wilson Act expressly 
mandated equal treatment of in-state and out-of-state liquor. 
                                                 
14 See KYVIG, supra note 8, at 6. 
15 Id. 
16 PEGRAM, supra note 9, at 79. 
17 Congress may modify the prohibitions of the dormant Commerce Clause by ordinary 
legislation (though it cannot change the scope of the Commerce Clause). Incidentally, this 
proposition was settled by the Webb Kenyon Act, which the Supreme Court upheld against 
the charge that the Act unconstitutionally delegated Congress’s power over interstate 
commerce to the states. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland, 242 U.S. 311 
(1917). 
18 An Act To Limit The Effect Of The Regulations Of Commerce Between The Several 
States And With Foreign Countries In Certain Cases, 26 Stat. 313 (Aug. 8, 1890). 
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The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the Wilson Act as 
allowing states to regulate the resale of imported alcohol, but not to prohibit 
the importation of liquor itself.19 The importation of alcohol for personal 
use, the Court held, was a constitutional right. In Vance v. Vandercook, 
decided in 1898, the Court confronted a South Carolina regulatory scheme 
that required all liquor sold in state to pass through a dispensary system run 
by state officials. The Court upheld the dispensary system against a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge, but simultaneously recognized the right of 
South Carolina citizens to receive direct shipments of alcohol from out-of-
state for personal use: “the right of persons in one state to ship liquor into 
another state to a resident for his own use is derived from the constitution of 
the United States, and does not rest on the grant of the State law.”20 The dry 
states could thus prohibit the sale or resale of alcohol within their borders, 
but still could not prevent liquor from leaking in from other states.  
Perhaps because of this difficulty, only three prohibition states 
remained by 1904. But by 1906 the dry forces, led by the Anti-Saloon 
League, had gained steam once again. Energized by the infamous Carry 
Nation’s hatchet attacks on saloons throughout the United States,21 
prohibitionists pushed anti-liquor measures in states throughout the Union. 
They took a bottom up approach, focusing first on localities and counties. 
“By 1906 more than half the counties, 60 percent of incorporated towns and 
villages, and close to 70 percent of American townships – territory in which 
almost 35 million Americans (40 percent of the population) resided – had 
banned saloons.”22 After drying up municipalities, the dry forces moved to 
the state legislatures. By April 1917, twenty six states, more than ever 
before, had adopted prohibition in one form or another.23 
                                                 
19 The Court adopted this restrictive interpretation perhaps because of the constitutional 
questions the alternative interpretation would raise. The Court had not yet ruled on whether 
Congress could delegate its powers over interstate commerce to the states.  
20 Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1898). 
21 PEGRAM, supra note 9, at 110-111. 
22 PEGRAM, supra note 9, at 111. 
23 See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 n.6 
(2006). Only thirteen of the twenty-six dry states, however, “had sought to anticipate on a 
state-wide basis the drastic bone-dry legislation of the Eighteenth Amendment.” See 
CHARLES MERZ, THE DRY DECADE 22 (1931). “The remaining “dry” states allowed the 
importation and/or manufacture of alcohol for personal use, although some restricted the 
type of alcohol permitted and many limited the amount that could be imported during any 
given period.” Post, supra, at 5 n.6. 
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Paralleling the string of dry victories in the states was dry political 
agitation in Congress. As states went dry one by one, they discovered once 
again the difficulties of preventing bootleggers from shipping liquor from 
out-of-state. The Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of the Wilson 
Act in Vance v. Vandercook had recognized a constitutional obligation on 
states to allow direct shipments of alcohol for personal use, rendering their 
prohibition laws virtually unenforceable. Congress reacted to dry pressure 
in 1913 by passing the Webb Kenyon Act, which prohibited the shipment of 
alcohol into any state in violation of the state’s laws.24 In essence, the Webb 
Kenyon Act was designed to “close the direct shipment loophole”25 left 
open by the Wilson Act and the Vance Court by allowing dry states to 
forbid imports. During the congressional debates, Senator Stone declared 
that the Webb-Kenyon Act would “merely put the shipper outside of 
Missouri or Iowa or Arkansas upon a level, that is upon terms of equality, 
so far as State law and regulation go, with the shipper within the State.”26 
Dry states now could add bite to their bark. 
In six years, however, Webb-Kenyon became moot. Riding waves 
of dry sentiment, anti-liquor activists built the Prohibition Amendment into 
the Constitution in record speed. The Anti-Saloon League drafted proposed 
language that would forbid the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, 
which was approved in 1917 by a Senate vote of 65-20 and a House tally of 
282-128. The Amendment went then to the state legislatures. Within just 
thirteen months the requisite number of state legislatures had given their 
blessing to prohibition. The Amendment gave a one year grace period 
before the formal ban took effect. And so dawn broke on the new era of 
federal Prohibition on January 17, 1920.27 
What accounts for the prohibitionists’ rapid string of victories from 
1906-1919? In several ways, World War I played an indispensable role. An 
influx of beer drinking German immigrants over the past half century had 
produced an explosion in breweries.28 Beer became commonplace. 
Americans, especially these new immigrants, migrated inwards to urban 
areas, bringing their “wet” culture with them. Protestant, churchgoing, 
liquor-detesting, rural Americans felt their cultural dominance challenged 
                                                 
24 An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors Of Their Interstate Character In Certain Cases, 37 
Stat. 699 (Mar. 1, 1913). 
25 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 462 (2005). 
26 49 Cong. Rec. 4917 (statement of Sen. Stone) (1913). 
27 See PEGRAM, supra note 9, at 138. 
28 See BEHR, supra note 10, at 63-65. 
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by the new immigrants.29 Antipathy to German-Americans multiplied after 
the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915.30 America’s entry into the war on the 
side of Britain and France, combined with Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson’s infamous denunciations of “hyphenated Americans,” 
made hostility to German-Americans and their beer drinking culture seem a 
patriotic duty. Drys “lost no time reminding Americans that the brewing 
interests were almost all in German hands, and that at some brewers’ 
meetings the very language used was German.”31 
In a perfect storm, other factors coincided to bolster the dry cause. 
That “[r]aw materials used in the production of beer and spirits were needed 
for the war effort”32 added another argument to the prohibitionists’ 
arsenal.33 Indeed, “the production of liquor used up huge quantities of grain, 
sugar and other foodstuffs needed for the armed forces . . .”34 Meanwhile, 
industrialization increased the need for safe, sober workers, bringing 
businessmen over to the dry side. In terms of political strength, the Anti-
Saloon League and the WCTU were far better organized and committed 
than their wet counterparts. In a misunderstanding that fragmented the wets, 
until almost the last minute breweries and wineries were convinced that 
their products would be exempted from any ban on alcohol. And 
importantly, many state legislatures were sharply malapportioned, giving 
drys in rural areas disproportionate strength over largely urban wets in the 
ratification fight.35 
Perhaps most important to the ultimate triumph of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, however, was the passage of the federal income tax 
amendment in 1913. In that year, federal alcohol taxes amounted to $230.1 
million, accounting for an astonishing and indispensable 32.2% of total 
                                                 
29 Robert Post writes that the “roots of prohibition lay in evangelical protestant moralism, 
so much so that Richard Hofstadter could dismiss it as a ‘pseudo-reform’ produced by a 
‘rural evangelical virus’ capable of transmuting ‘the reforming energies of the country . . . 
into mere peevishness.’” See POST, supra note 23, at 15. 
30 PEGRAM, supra note 9, at 144. 
31 BEHR, supra note 10, at 67. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 416 (2005) (“Prominent brewers were of German descent, and the war made it 
easy to stigmatize all things German. (As a rule, Prohibition ran strongest among rural, 
native-born Americans who looked askance at recent immigrants and urban culture.)”). 
32 See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
138-39 (1994). 
33 See AMAR, supra note 31, at 416. (“Since grain and sugar were in short supply, 
Prohibition could be packaged as a patriotic act as well as a moral policy.”). 
34 JOHN KOBLER, ARDENT SPIRITS: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 206 (1973). 
35 See AMAR, supra note 27, at 416. 
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federal revenues. By 1917, however, the federal government was drawing 
$387.3 million from individual and corporate income taxes, or 35% of total 
revenues. (Alcohol taxes in that year totaled $284 million). Put simply, with 
an established income tax base, alcohol taxes were no longer critical to the 
functioning of the federal government. One of the most important 
arguments in the wet arsenal had been defanged.36 
And so America embarked on its experiment in Prohibition. Every 
casual student of American history knows the broad outlines of the sad tale 
of Prohibition in the 1920s and early 1930s. Congress overreached in the 
beginning by defining “intoxicating liquors” to mean not only distilled 
spirits, but wine and beer as well.37 Outlawing such popular commodities 
instantly created a profitable black market. Bootleggers drew from stashes 
of alcohol in the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.38 “The Bahamas 
became a privileged halfway house – the Medellin of the Prohibition era.”39 
“Rumrunners” consistently outwitted the U.S. Coast Guard, using 
increasingly sophisticated codes to communicate with shore.40 Lacking 
legal enforcement mechanisms, underground liquor dealers turned to 
bribery, violence, and coercion. “Major gang wars were fought to establish 
market control in numerous cities.”41 Alcohol consumption remained 
incredibly high: less than two years after the passage of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, the U.S. government “reckoned that bootlegging had become 
a one billion dollar business, and a senior official urged the government to 
take steps to recover $32 million from bootleggers in excess profits 
taxes.”42 
By the end of the decade Americans had seen enough. The major 
movements for repeal, including the Association Against the Prohibition 
Amendment, first gained traction in 1927. In 1929, the “Depression 
accelerated the swing away from Prohibition.”43 Americans saw their life 
savings evaporate in the stock market crash of 1929 and could no longer 
afford to buy illegal alcohol. Millionaires, including Pierre DuPont, 
                                                 
36 See MEIER, at 139-40. 
37 Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1920). 
38 BEHR, supra note 10, at 130. 
39 BEHR, supra note 10, at 131. 
40 The Coast Guard’s Prohibition-era experience in cryptanalysis proved useful during the 
Second World War. 
41 MEIER, supra note 32, at 141. 
42 BEHR, supra note 10, at 147. 
43 BEHR, supra note 10, at 233. 
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“claimed that if Britain’s liquor tax system were applied to America, this 
would ‘permit the total abolition of income tax, both personal and 
corporate.’”44 The U.S. government developed a similar interest in the 
potential infusion of tax revenue repeal would bring: there was a “growing 
awareness among economists and business leaders, as well as private 
citizens, that by banning liquor, the government had, since 1920, cut itself 
off from extremely valuable tax revenue.”45 By early 1933, the country was 
ready for another constitutional amendment. 
 
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES 
 
Prohibition’s repeal, in some sense, was a step backwards in time. The 
straightforward repeal of federal prohibition itself was rather 
uncontroversial; over seventy percent of the American public voted in favor 
of repeal during popular elections in the states. But while drafting the 
Twenty-first Amendment, the nation faced precisely the issues of 
yesteryear: what sorts of state alcohol laws were legitimate, and which ones 
contravened the dormant Commerce Clause? What regulatory role should 
the federal government play, if any? And a novel question: should Congress 
require the states to call conventions to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment, 
thus rejecting the state legislature route for the first time in the nation’s 
history?  
 
A.  Building Webb-Kenyon Into The Constitution 
 
For a constitutional provision that has generated many modern disputes, 
section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was remarkably uncontroversial 
in its own time. Should the Eighteenth Amendment be repealed, supporters 
of the Twenty-first Amendment substantially agreed that states should keep 
the authority to stay dry if they so wished. The congressional debates 
reflected this consensus. Since no one seriously tried to strike section 2 out 
of the proposed Amendment, the discussions in Congress are limited. 
 Senator Blaine, the spokesman for the Judiciary Committee, opened 
the discussion of section 2 by outlining the history of the Wilson and Webb-
Kenyon Acts. The Wilson Act, passed in 1890, was designed to allow states 
to regulate alcohol once it crossed their borders. In Rhodes v. Iowa,46 (and 
                                                 
44 BEHR, supra note 10, at 233. 
45 BEHR, supra note 10, at 232. 
46 170 U.S. 412 (1898). 
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Vance v. Vandercook) however, the Supreme Court gave the Act “rather a 
restricted construction”, allowing state regulation only once the liquor “had 
actually been delivered to the consignee.” This interpretation meant that 
states had the power to control the resale of imported alcohol, but powerless 
to restrict the importation of alcohol itself. In practice, this meant that dry 
states could not prevent wet states from sending alcohol across their 
borders. In 1913, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act, clarifying that 
dry states did have the power to prevent the importation of alcohol 
altogether. President Taft vetoed the Webb-Kenyon Act, arguing that it was 
an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s power over interstate 
commerce to the states. But Congress immediately re-passed the Act with 
the requisite two-thirds majority. Four years later, in Clark Distilling v. 
American Express,47 the Supreme Court sustained the Act against 
constitutional challenge by a vote of seven to two. The passage of the 
Repeal Amendment in 1919 rendered the constitutional debates moot. But 
with the repeal of Prohibition, the issue of how to protect the dry states rose 
again to the fore.48 
If section 2 was meant to protect dry states, the Webb-Kenyon Act 
provided the best model. The language of section 2 thus tracked closely the 
language of the Webb-Kenyon Act. Senator Blaine said: “So, to assure the 
so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those 
States, it is proposed to write permanently into the Constitution a 
prohibition along that line.” Senator Borah expressed his view that the 
Webb-Kenyon Act needed to be reaffirmed by constitutional amendment: 
without section 2, “we are turning the dry States over for protection to a law 
which is still of doubtful constitutionality and which, as it was upheld by a 
divided court, might very well be held unconstitutional upon a re-
presentation of it.”49 Senator Wagner agreed: “if the dry States want 
additional assurance that they will be protected I shall have no objection.”50 
Congress evidently envisioned a checkerboard of states, some wet and some 
dry, arising after repeal. If a state chose to remain dry, section 2 would 
allow it to block the flow of alcohol across its borders.51 Newspapers at the 
                                                 
47 242 U.S. 311 (1917). 
48 This paragraph draws from Senator Blaine’s statements at 76 Cong. Rec. 4140-41. 
49 76 Cong. Rec. 4170 (statement of Sen. Borah). 
50 76 Cong. Rec. 4171 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
51 Debates in the House show that House members also thought of section 2 as a protective 
shield for dry states. See, eg., 76 Cong. Rec. 4514 (“A majority of . . . [Congress] . . . [will 
vote] . . . to take the prohibition issue of Congress, and prohibition itself, out of the 
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time confirm this understanding of the purpose of section 2.52 
 The harder question was what degree of control the wet states would 
be allowed to assert over the alcohol traffic. Would states be allowed to 
discriminate against interstate commerce? Isolated arguments from Senator 
Blaine seem to point in that direction:  
When our Government was organized and the 
Constitution of the United States adopted, the States 
surrendered control over and regulation of interstate 
commerce. This proposal is restoring to the States, in 
effect, the right to regulate commerce respecting a single 
commodity – namely, intoxicating liquor. In other words, 
the State is not surrendering any power that it possesses, 
but rather, by reason of this provision, in effect acquires 
powers that it has not at this time.53 
Later, Senator Blaine also said flatly: “The purpose of section 2 is to 
restore to the States by constitutional amendment absolute control in effect 
over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the 
                                                                                                                            
Constitution and return it to the States, where it belongs and where it will be safely 
handled, as previously.”) (statement of Rep. Dyer); 76 Cong. Rec. 4514 (“Each State must 
determine for itself the type of supervision it wishes over the distribution of liquor.”) 
(statement of Rep. Celler); 76 Cong. Rec. 4518 (“Section 2 attempts to protect dry States.”) 
(statement of Rep. Robinson); 76 Cong. Rec. 4519 (“Section 2 prohibits the transportation 
or importation of intoxicating liquors for delivery or use into any of the several States 
where the laws of the States prohibit such. This section, it is claimed, will protect the dry 
States.”) (statement of Rep. Garber); 76 Cong. Rec. 4523 (“If 36 States should act in favor 
of ratifying this proposed amendment, then, undoubtedly, each and every State in the 
Union could be just as dry as its own laws make it and as its own courts and juries make 
it.”) (statement of Rep. McSwain); 76 Cong. Rec. 4526 (“[Section 2] will aid and protect 
the so-called dry States in permitting them to exclude, if their citizens so wish, all liquor 
traffic in their domains.”) (statement of Rep. Tierney). 
52 See, eg., Senate Votes Today On Dry Repeal Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1933 at 1 
(“There is no question but that there are many members of the House who voted for the 
Garner naked repeal resolution who would rather vote for a repeal resolution containing 
some sort of a provision designed to protect dry States from the influx of liquor from those 
which might be wet.”); Dry Amendment In Its 14th Year With Battle On: Beer Bill In 
Committee As Drys Say They Have Just Begun To Fight, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
Jan. 16, 1933, at 2 (“[A] resolution repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, but also 
affording protection to dry states . . . was approved by a Senate Committee . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Repeal Plan Voted By Senate Group; Sales Control Kept: Dry States Protected, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 1933 at p. 1; Roy Malcolm, Storms Ahead For The Wets, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 1932 at A4 (Republican Party would “prevent the flow of liquor from wet into dry 
States”). 
53 76 Cong. Rec. 4141 (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
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confines of the States.”54 
 In the House, Rep. McSwain echoed Blaine’s sentiments, 
contending that Section 2 would return to the states “absolute” power to 
regulate the liquor traffic: 
The proposal voted on to-day gives to every State 
absolute power to control the manufacture, sale, and 
transportation of alcoholic and intoxicating beverages. It 
will be up to the people of every State to say whether or not 
they will permit any intoxicating beverages to be sold or 
transported or stored in each such State, and if they, but 
their State laws, prohibit such manufacture, sale, and 
transportation within the State, then, such State laws will be 
supreme on that question, and whiskies can not be shipped 
into, or transported into such State; and, if laws prohibiting 
such importation and transportation of intoxicating 
beverages are violated by common carriers, or by private 
individuals, then State courts, and State juries must try, and 
convict, and punish all such violations.55 
 Despite the two statements by Senator Blaine and Representative 
McSwain, the better (though by no means conclusive) view is that Congress 
did not intend to bless discrimination against interstate commerce. First, no 
other Senator echoed Blaine’s “absolute control” sentiments.56 Second, 
Blaine’s comments are arguably consistent with a non-discrimination 
interpretation. A state might indeed regulate and control interstate 
commerce in liquor, so long as equal restrictions applied within the state. 
For example, a licensing system solely for out of state liquor producers 
would exceed state authority under section 2. But a licensing system that 
applied to all producers, whether in-state or out-of-state, would be 
legitimate. Third, surely the “repeal by implication” of federal constitutional 
provisions should be disfavored. If Congress had meant to remove liquor 
from the purview of the Commerce Clause, it would have said so explicitly. 
Most importantly, the language of Section 2 tracked the language of the 
Webb-Kenyon Act. As I have shown, the Webb Kenyon Act was designed 
to protect dry states from the importation of liquor from out of state, not to 
                                                 
54 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added). 
55 76 Cong. Rec. 4508 (statement of Rep. McSwain). 
56 Of course, since debate was so limited, perhaps other senators simply didn’t have a 
chance to echo Blaine. 
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authorize discrimination against interstate commerce. No congressman 
suggested that Section 2 reached further than the Webb-Kenyon Act. Under 
this non-discrimination interpretation, of course, Section 2’s only real bite 
would be to protect the dry states.57 
 
B.  The Question Of Federal Control 
 
More time was spent during the Senate debates considering an 
“amendment to the amendment.” The proposed Section 3, which was 
ultimately not enacted, read: “Congress shall have concurrent power to 
regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the 
premises where sold.” Its purpose, supporters stressed repeatedly, was not 
to drain power from the states, but merely to allow Congress to prevent the 
return of the hated saloon. They pointed out that the proposed amendment 
did not confer plenary power over alcohol on Congress, but only allowed 
Congress “to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk 
on the premises where sold.” “On the premises where sold” meant 
“saloons.” Without Section 3, the saloon could be abolished only by state 
legislation. 
 The proposal was immediately under assault. Opponents, including 
the Association against the Prohibition Amendment, charged that Section 3 
would take away the victory of repeal by leaving control of the liquor issue 
to the federal government. Senator Wagner led the charge: “the pending 
resolution does not in fact repeal the inherently false philosophy of the 
eighteenth amendment. It does not correct the central error of national 
prohibition. It does not restore to the States responsibility for their local 
liquor problems.”58 It did not matter that the power granted by section 3 was 
limited to the abolishing of saloons. When combined with the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, “my imagination is not sufficiently fertile to foresee all 
                                                 
57 But as this paper will show, few states took advantage of their constitutional right to 
prohibit alcohol within their borders after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
Almost eighty years later, no state prohibits the sale or use of alcohol. If section 2 really 
was intended only to preserve the right of dry states to remain dry, then section 2 has 
become a dead letter. These developments have led courts to twist themselves into 
contortions when interpreting section 2. Searching for some sort of independent function 
section 2 might serve, courts of appeals have upheld state alcohol regulations that would 
normally violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See, eg., Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 
(4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 2007 WL 444488 (upholding Virginia laws prohibiting the in-
state transportation of more than one gallon of alcohol bought out-of-state). 
58 76 Cong. Rec. 4144 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
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of the extensions which will be grafted onto section 3.”59 By including 
section 3, Senator Wagner said, “we have expelled the system of national 
control through the front door of section 1 and readmitted it forthwith 
through the back door of section 3.”60  
 Objectors also seized on the word “concurrent.” What did it mean? 
What would happen in cases of conflict between state and federal laws 
covering the same subject? To Senator Walsh, there was no conflict. If a 
state were to forego prohibiting the saloon, and the federal government 
were to prohibit it, a saloon owner could be prosecuted under federal law 
but not under state law.61 Senator Brookhart, however, added another twist: 
“Suppose the State of New York made the saloon legal by affirmative 
enactment?”62 In that case, Walsh had to concede that “[t]he State of New 
York could not make the saloon legal as against a federal statute. It would 
be a nullification of a Federal statute.”63 But in that case, what was the 
meaning of the word “concurrent?” 
 The debate over the proposed section 3 raged in the public as well. 
Women’s organizations, including the Women’s Committee for Repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment, pushed for exclusive state control over the 
alcohol problem. Mrs. Charles Sabin, national chairwoman of the Women’s 
Organization for National Prohibition Reform, announced that “we would 
oppose any resolution which leaves the problem of liquor control in the 
hands of the federal government.”64 The American Hotel Association also 
understandably opposed giving Congress the power to prohibit the “sale of 
intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold”; Arthur L. 
Race, the Association’s chairman, decried the proposed section 3 as “a 
constant threat to the establishment of an orderly liquor traffic within 
individual states” and feared that it would “vitiate State liquor codes.”65 
 Motivated by concerns about overly expansive federal regulatory 
power and the confusion that would result from concurrent federal and state 
                                                 
59 76 Cong. Rec. 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner). Wagner went through a litany of 
prohibition era Supreme Court decisions to illustrate how extensive federal power could 
spring from seemingly terse constitutional provisions. 
60 76 Cong. Rec. 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
61 See 76 Cong. Rec. 4155 (exchange between Sen. Brookhart and Sen. Walsh). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Women Wets Call For Repeal First, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1932, at 2. 
65 Hotels To Be Dry While Law Stays: Repeal Bill Criticized, N.Y. TIMES Jan 19, 1933 at 
22. 
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authority, the Senate rejected Section 3. It might be argued, then, that the 
rejection of Section 3 showed a congressional intent to remove entirely 
from the federal government the authority to regulate alcohol. The better 
view, however, is that Congress only rejected the idea that the federal 
government should have authority to regulate intrastate alcohol 
transactions. Section 3, after all, was narrowly drafted. It would only have 
authorized congressional regulation of the saloon. At no point was there a 
suggestion that the federal government would lose its power to regulate 
interstate commerce in alcohol. 
 
C.  Asking The People: Ratification By Convention 
 
Perhaps the most vigorous and interesting debate in the Senate and 
in the public concerned whether to submit the Twenty-first Amendment to 
state legislatures or to state conventions. Article V of the Constitution 
allows constitutional amendments to be ratified either by conventions or by 
legislatures.  
The 1933 interest in conventions apparently originated in an opinion 
by a maverick federal district court judge in 1930. Citing Charles Beard for 
the proposition that “a search for ‘the will of the people who made the 
Constitution’ leads into a Serbonian bog,”66 Judge William Clark concluded 
that the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment by state legislatures 
rendered the Amendment invalid. Dodging the explicit language of Article 
V,67 Judge Clark relied on “political thought” and “scientific principles” to 
conclude that constitutional amendments “designed to transfer to the United 
States powers heretofore reserved to the states, or, if there are any such, to 
the people” must be ratified by conventions.68 According to Judge Clark: 
“This follows from the character of such amendments and from the 
character of the delegates to and deliberations in a constitutional 
convention, as compared with the corresponding character of the personnel 
of state Legislatures and their deliberations.”69 Judge Clark also pointed out 
that conventions assembled only for the purpose of acting upon a 
constitutional amendment are “disturbed by no hope of political gain or fear 
of political punishment.”70 The court accordingly struck down the 
                                                 
66 United States v. Sprague, 44 F.2d 967, 981 (D.C.N.J. 1930). 
67 See U.S. CONST. art. V 
68 Sprague, 44 F.2d at 981. 
69 Sprague, 44 F.2d at 981. 
70 Id.at 982. 
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Eighteenth Amendment.71 
Judge Clark anticipated that “[e]ven if this opinion meets with a cold 
reception in the appellate courts, we hope that it will at least have the effect 
of focusing the country’s thought upon the neglected method of considering 
constitutional amendments in conventions.”72 He was right on both counts. 
On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Roberts held 
that the terms of Article V are unambiguous, leaving no room for Judge 
Clark’s reliance on political science: “The Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal 
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention 
is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or 
addition.”73  
Judge Clark’s opinion may have been bad constitutional law, but it 
was good politics.74 Joseph Percival Pollard, in 1932, refined Clark’s 
position, contending that the Framers intended “mere procedural changes in 
the framework of the federal system” to be ratified by legislatures, “while 
changes of substance, such as giving new power over citizens to the federal 
arm, would have to be done in conventions, like the original grants of power 
to state and nation.”75  To the argument that the first ten amendments were 
undoubtedly “changes of substance” and had been ratified by legislatures, 
Pollard responded that “[r]atifying these amendments . . . was the merely 
formal act of ratifying a previous convention-made agreement, and to save 
time and expense . . .”76 Pollard contended (with some truth) that the 
                                                 
71 The anti-prohibition litigants in United States v. Sprague had urged a slightly more 
plausible theory to declare the Eighteenth Amendment unconstitutional. The Tenth 
Amendment, they said, when read in conjunction with Article V, requires all constitutional 
amendments purporting to shift powers from the states or the people to the federal 
government to be ratified by conventions. But Judge Clark explicitly disclaimed any 
reliance on the Tenth Amendment. 
72 Id. at 967. 
73 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). 
74 Fifteen years later, the people of Missouri would build this concept into their state 
Constitution. See MO. CONST. art. 1, § 4. (“That Missouri is a free and independent state, 
subject only to the Constitution of the United States; that all proposed amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States qualifying or affecting the individual liberties of the 
people or which in any wise may impair the right of local self-government belonging to the 
people of this state, should be submitted to conventions of the people.”). 
75 Joseph Percival Pollard, Wake Up, Supreme Court! The Eighteenth Amendment Violates 
the Constitution, LXXXVIII FORUM & CENTURY 4, at 213 (Oct 1932). Pollard called Judge 
Clark the “savior of the Constitution,” saying that Clark “had the wit and courage to use his 
judicial position to perform an act of statesmanship and high policy . . .” Id. 
76 Id. 
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ratification of the Prohibition Amendment by malapportioned state 
legislatures had subverted the will of the people.77 
Both the Republican and Democratic Party platforms in the 1932 
election also called for submitting the Twenty-first Amendment to state 
conventions.78 The official line, promulgated by Democratic Party chairman 
John J. Raskob, was that state conventions would allow a neutral 
“referendum” on the prohibition question, thus ostensibly taking “the issue 
out of politics.”79 In a statement of his position published in the New York 
Times, Raskob argued that “prohibition is a social question and should be 
taken out of politics and out of the hands of politicians.”80 In reality, wets 
were rightly convinced that the repeal Amendment enjoyed widespread 
popular support. Casting the convention plan as a popular referendum also 
allowed repeal advocates to portray opponents as anti-democratic. The New 
Jersey legislature even took steps toward calling a national constitutional 
convention, apparently believing that Congress might not act.81 
Supporters of the convention plan in the Senate were concerned that 
special interests could capture the state legislatures. The seven years given 
by the Amendment for its ratification could allow opponents to buy off state 
legislators, many of whom had been elected before the repeal issue “became 
acute.”82 Indeed, Senator Bingham argued, “in many States the members of 
legislatures are elected year after year, and hold a kind of hereditary seat in 
the legislature . . .” making them unresponsive to public opinion.83 Many of 
these state legislators had “a record of having voted dry always, that it 
would be extremely difficult for them to change their votes.”84 Senator 
                                                 
77 Id. (“[I]n Illinois, as in New York, the traditional rivalry between urban wets and rural 
drys, with an outmoded system of legislative apportionment favoring the rural districts, 
made it easy for the [Anti-Saloon] League to dictate its dry policy to the wet city of 
Chicago.”) 
78 See Republican Party Platform of 1932 (“Such an amendment should be promptly 
submitted to the States by Congress, to be acted upon by State conventions called for that 
sole purpose in accordance with Article V of the Constitution and adequately safeguarded 
so as to be truly representative . . .”); Democratic Party Platform of 1932 (“To effect such 
repeal we demand that the Congress immediately propose a Constitutional Amendment to 
truly represent [sic] the conventions in the states called to act solely on that proposal . . .”). 
79 Again Asks Home Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 1932, at 1. 
80 Text of Chairman John J. Raskob’s Letter On Home Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 1932, at 
17. 
81 Map Jersey Action To End Prohibition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 10, 1932, at 25. 
82 76 Cong. Rec. 4158 (statement of Sen. Robinson). 
83 76 Cong. Rec. 4166 (statement of Sen. Bingham). 
84 Id. 
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Lewis made his distrust of the state legislatures explicit: 
It was that our people in all the States had seen 
themselves tricked by legislatures. They had watched some, 
out of corruption, cheat the constituency. They had seen 
others, in their wild race to other objects of private benefits, 
exchange one purpose in order to obtain another. The 
deception had, in different forms, been so practiced upon 
them that they hastened to adopt some other remedy and 
some other method than to abide by that from which they 
had suffered losses and defeats only lately in so many 
States of the Union.85 
Moreover, malapportionment in the state legislatures made the future of 
the repeal Amendment uncertain. The New York Times detailed attempts by 
Kentucky wets to reapportion the badly skewed state legislature before the 
submission of the Twenty-first Amendment.86 
Nevertheless, the Judiciary Committee chose, above vigorous 
dissent, to submit the Amendment to the legislatures. Vigorous discord 
ensued. When the Twenty-first Amendment was reported to the full Senate, 
Senator Robinson of Arkansas was incredulous: “I should like to ask the 
Senator from Wisconsin, who has worked so hard and diligently on the 
pending joint resolution, why it was that the committee reporting it 
disregarded the declaration of both political parties in favor of ratification 
by conventions?”87 The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, 
which had campaigned since 1919 for the repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, was likewise infuriated, and even threatened to drop its 
support for the Twenty-first Amendment. 
Senator Blaine, the committee’s spokesman, justified the decision 
on two grounds. First, the “fundamental question involved in this issue is 
whether or not the eighteenth amendment shall be repealed.”88 Blaine did 
not consider the “question of the mode of repeal” to be “the essence of the 
question at all.”89 Second, Blaine appealed to economy: “Now, we must 
face the fact that the convention system is going to be an expensive method 
                                                 
85 76 Cong. Rec. 4159 (statement of Sen. Lewis). 
86 Robert E. Dundon, Kentucky Facing Fight On Dry Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1933 at 
67. 
87 76 Cong. Rec. 4139 (statement of Sen. Robinson). 
88 76 Cong. Rec. 4139 (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
89 76 Cong. Rec. 4139-40 (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
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for ratification.” In a wet state, where ratification was all but foreordained, 
it would be senseless and needlessly costly to require state legislatures to 
establish conventions and call special elections.90 This cost problem was all 
the more acute in a time of economic depression, when the states were 
strapped for funds.91 
Senator Walsh of Montana added his support to the ratification by 
legislature plan. He argued that the convention plan would delay ratification 
of the Twenty-first Amendment for at least two years. The legislatures, after 
receiving the proposed amendment from Congress, would have to decide 
“when and where [the conventions] should be called, whether the delegates 
should be elected by congressional district or by State assembly districts, or 
by other districts to be created for that express purpose.”92 Moreover, in a 
time of economic depression, the states would be forced to bear the costs of 
the special elections.93 Walsh suspected that “at least half” of the states 
would “let [the special election] go over until the next general election and 
then delegates will be elected without any special additional cost for the 
election.”94 Certainly the legislatures could call special sessions to speed 
things up, Walsh conceded, but did anyone really think that the requisite 
thirty-six states would do so?95 
The U.S. Senate’s distrust of the state legislatures provoked Senator 
Barkley to ask a novel question: what would happen if the state legislatures 
refused to call conventions?96 What could Congress do about it? The text of 
Article V illuminated no plain answer, and the ensuing debate highlighted 
the various possibilities. Walsh took a hard states’ rights view, saying flatly: 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Senator Borah put the point compellingly: “Mr. President, we are confronted now with 
the fact that millions of our people are starving; the Federal Government is almost ready to 
go into the hands of a receiver; the States are borrowing money by the millions from the 
Federal Government; counties, municipalities, subdivisions of government are doing the 
same thing, and if we provide for submission of this question to conventions, we are about 
to put upon the backs of the taxpayers of the United States millions of dollars of expense to 
carry out this simple mandate.” 76 Cong. Rec. 4161 (statement of Sen. Borah). 
92 76 Cong. Rec. 4149 (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. Whatever the merits of Walsh’s reasoning, his predictive powers were not impressive. 
Congress sent the proposed Twenty-first Amendment to the states on February 20, 1933. 
Within a few months most states had passed laws calling special elections, which were held 
mostly over the summer of 1933. By December of 1933, a bare ten months later, the 
Amendment was ratified. 
96 76 Cong. Rec. 4150 (statement of Sen. Barkley). 
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“We could do nothing.”97 The people of each state were free, Walsh argued, 
to “elect a legislature that will call a convention.”98 Senator Borah 
suggested a second option: “if the legislature itself does not provide a 
method by which a convention may be called, may not the people of the 
State themselves organize through committees and call conventions without 
the aid of the legislature? I do not think we can deprive the people of the 
right to assemble together in a convention if they desire to act upon such a 
question as this in that way.”99  
A third view was for Congress to call and prescribe the form of the 
state conventions directly. This suggestion triggered ire in the House. 
Representative Celler argued that “by reasonable interpretation the word 
‘convention’ as used in Article V of the Constitution precludes and repels 
the idea that the convention shall be called, elected, organized, or governed 
by congressional fiat. I incline to the belief that that must and shall be a 
State matter exclusively.”100 Representative Garber insisted that “[t]he State 
legislatures will fix the time and place of holding the conventions, the 
number of delegates, the apportionment of delegates, the qualifications of 
delegates, and the voters.”101 Representative McSwain, during a long 
speech, lambasted the idea of allowing Congress to construct the 
conventions as “unconstitutional, un-American, undemocratic, and 
unwise.”102 Since the state legislatures acted rapidly, Congress never had 
the opportunity to test its power to prescribe state constitutional conventions 
directly. An important constitutional question was left for another day–a 
question that remains unanswered. 
The repeal amendment passed the Senate in mid February by a vote 
of 63-23. It was submitted to the House a few days later, and approved by a 
tally of 289-121. On February 21, 1933, Secretary of State Henry L. 
Stimson sent the text of the proposed Twenty-first Amendment to the states, 
where the final battle of the ratification war would be fought.103 The first 
step of the final phase called for state legislatures to create the machinery 
                                                 
97 76 Cong. Rec. 4150 (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
98 Id. 
99 76 Cong. Rec. 4150 (statement of Sen. Borah). 
100 76 Cong. Rec. 4515 (statement of Rep. Celler). 
101 76 Cong. Rec. 4519 (statement of Rep. Garber). 
102 76 Cong. Rec. 4524 (statement of Rep. McSwain). 
103 EDWARD SOMERVILLE BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: STATE CONVENTION RECORDS AND LAWS 515 
(1938). 
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for special elections and to pass special laws for the assembling of 
conventions.104 
 
III. THE RATIFICATION MACHINERY: STATE LAWS, POPULAR VOTES, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
 
A.  State Laws 
 
The spring and summer of 1933 saw a flurry of activity as dozens of 
state legislatures passed laws establishing constitutional conventions. As the 
states wrote their laws, they had little or no guidance. Proposals in Congress 
had surfaced for a “general law” to be followed by the state legislatures, but 
none had passed.105 And since all twenty previous constitutional 
amendments had been ratified by legislatures, the states were forced to draft 
their laws on a blank slate. 
Though no common template guided the states, the results showed a 
remarkable uniformity. The typical state law was fairly detailed, 
establishing dates for a popular election and a convention, and detailing the 
number of delegates, their qualifications, the nomination process, 
compensation, and from where they would be elected. The standard law 
also prescribed the form and contents of the election ballots (sometimes in 
graphic form), the chairman of the convention, the administration of the 
oath of office, the overall organization of the convention, and the 
certification of the results.106 
There were some important differences. About half the state 
legislatures anticipated later congressional action to prescribe uniform 
forms and procedures for the conventions. In that event, most of these states 
chose to pledge allegiance to the federal law. California’s statute, for 
                                                 
104 The rest of Section 3 provided that the Amendment “shall be inoperative unless it shall 
have been ratified . . . within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the 
States by the Congress.” U.S. CONST amend. XXI. As Professor Akhil Amar has noted, the 
seven years provision “raises intriguing questions and possibilities for twenty-first-century 
Americans pondering the permutations of permissible constitutional change.” AMAR, supra 
note 31, at 418. A future constitutional amendment might “provide that the amendment 
would be ‘inoperative’ unless ratified by four-fifths of the states, rather than a mere three 
quarters.” Id.  In that way, “future section 3 analogues could, as a practical matter, move 
America toward a more directly democratic system of amendment.” Id. 
105 See BROWN, supra note 103, at 515. During the congressional debates, one 
representative suggested a template. 
106 See, eg., 1933 Me. Acts 840. 
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example, read: “If . . . the Congress of the United States prescribes the 
manner in which such convention shall be constituted . . . all officers of the 
State who may by the Congress be authorized or directed to take any action 
to constitute such a convention for this State are hereby authorized and 
directed to act thereunder and in obedience thereto with the same force and 
effect as if acting under a statute of this State.”107  
New Mexico, however, set up a potential constitutional 
confrontation by expressly declaring void any later federal statute 
purporting to establish uniform convention procedures. The state legislature 
declared that “[a]ny attempt on the part of Congress in any manner to 
prescribe how and when the delegates to the convention may be nominated 
or elected, the date on which said convention shall be held in the several 
states, the number of delegates required to make a quorum, and the number 
of affirmative votes necessary to ratify the amendment submitted to such 
conventions, or any other requirements, shall be null and void in the state of 
New Mexico . . .”108 In a further jab at federal authority, New Mexico 
“authorized and required” state officials “to resist to the utmost any attempt 
to execute any and all such congressional dictation and usurpation.”109 The 
state’s convictions were never tested, and the provision seems to have been 
repealed sometime afterwards. 
 Some one third of the state legislatures passed generally applicable 
laws that would be triggered any time Congress selected the convention 
method of ratification for any proposed constitutional amendment. A typical 
provision read: “Whenever the Congress of the United States shall propose 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and shall propose 
that it be ratified by conventions in the several states, the governor shall fix 
by proclamation the date of an election for the purpose of electing the 
delegates to such convention in this state.”110 Fifteen other states adopted 
                                                 
107 1933 Cal. Stat. 842, § 12. Twenty other states followed California’s lead. See 1933 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws 403; 1933 Conn. Acts 835; 38 Del. Laws, ch. 5, § 1 (1933); 1933 Fla. Laws 
740; 1933 Idaho Sess. Laws 328; 1933 Ind. Acts 851; 1933 Iowa Acts 1; 1933 Md. Laws 
447; 1933 Mont. Laws 458; 1933 Nev. Stat. 252; 1933 Ohio Laws 74; 1933 Pa. Laws 233; 
1933 R.I. Pub. Laws 74; 1933 S.D. Sess. Laws 100; 1933 Ten. Pub. Acts 53; 1933 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 358; 1933 Utah Laws 36; 1933 Vt. Acts & Resolves 118; 1933 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 697; 1933 Wyo. Sess. Laws 111. 
108 1933 N.M. Laws 400, § 16. 
109 1933 N.M. Laws 400, § 16. 
110 1933 Ariz. Sess. Laws 403, § 1. This provision survives in amended form today. See 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-224 (2007) (“When congress proposes an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, and proposes that it be ratified by conventions in the several states, the 
 LIQUOR LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 25 
similar provisions, most of which are still on the books today.111 Twenty-six 
states, however, passed laws addressing the Twenty-first Amendment 
only.112 
 Nineteen states allowed the governor to call a special popular 
election by proclamation.113 California required the Secretary of State to 
call the election.114 More legislatures fixed specific dates themselves.115 In a 
testament to the strength of the repeal sentiment, these state laws provided 
for rapid special elections and quick conventions. Colorado’s law, for 
example, which was passed on August 10, called for an election on 
September 12 and a convention on September 26.116 Arkansas’s March 24 
law called for an election on July 18 and a convention on August 1.117 And 
Illinois’ law, which cleared the state legislature on April 28, provided for an 
                                                                                                                            
governor shall fix by proclamation the date of an election for the purpose of electing delegates 
to the convention to be held in this state.”). 
111 See 38 Del. Laws, ch. 5, § 1 (1933), current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7701 
(2007); 1933 Fla. Laws 740, § 1, current version at FLA. STAT. § 107.01 (2007); 1933 
Idaho Sess. Laws 328, § 1, current version at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2201 (2007); 1933 
Ind. Acts 851, § 1, current version at IND. CODE § 3-10-5-1 (2007); 1933 Iowa Acts 1 , § 1; 
1933 Mo. Laws 233, § 1; 1933 Mont. Laws 458, § 1; 1933 N.M. Laws 400, § 1, current 
version at N.M. STAT. § 1-18-1 (2007); 1933 Ohio Laws 74, § 1, current version at OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3523.01 (2007); 1933 S.D. Sess. Laws 100, § 1, current version at S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-15-1 (2007); 1933 Tex. Gen. Laws 358, § 1; 1933 Utah Laws 36, § 1, 
current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-15-101 (2007); 1933 Vt. Acts & Resolves 118, 
§ 294, current version at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1811 (2007); 1933 Wash. Sess. Laws 
697, § 1, current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.410 (2007); 1933 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws 111, § 1. 
112 See 1933 Ala. Laws 77, § 1; 1933 Ark. Acts 467, § 1; 1933 Cal. Stat. 598, § 1; 1933 
Colo. Sess. Laws 51, § 1; 1933 Conn. Acts 835, § 1; 1933 Ill. Laws 12, § 1; 1933 Ky. Acts 
22, § 1; 1933 Me. Acts 840, § 1; 1933 Md. Laws 447; 1933 Mass. Acts 161, § 1; 1933 
Mich. Pub. Acts 24, § 1; 1933 Minn. Laws 272, § 1; 1933 Neb. Laws 581, § 1; 1933 Nev. 
Stat. 252, § 1; 1933 N.H. Laws 153, § 1; 1933 N.J. Laws 143, § 1; 1933 N.Y. Laws 525, § 
1; 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 600, § 1; 1933 Or. Laws 845, § 1; 1933 Pa. Laws 233, § 1; 1933 
R.I. Pub. Laws 74 , § 1; 1933 S.C. Acts 1180, § 1; 1933 Ten. Pub. Acts 53, § 1; 1933 Va. 
Acts 3, § 1; 1933 W. Va. Acts 78, § 1; 1933 Wis. Sess. Laws 180, § 1. 
113 Those states were Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. 
114 1933 Cal. Laws 598. 
115 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. 
116 1933 Colo. Sess. Laws 51, § 1-2. 
117 1933 Ark. Acts 467, § 1-2. 
26 LIQUOR LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS  
election on June 5 and a convention on July 10.118 
  The states disagreed about whether to elect delegates by county, 
district, or from the state at large. Presumably because of malapportionment 
concerns, most states chose the latter method. Ohio, for example, prescribed 
fifty-two delegates to be elected by a statewide vote.119 Twenty-four other 
states followed suit.120 Only fourteen states chose to elect delegates by 
district.121 A few states compromised, electing one slate of delegates by 
district and the other slate from the state at large. Alabama, for example, 
prescribed “as many delegates from each county in the State as such county 
is now entitled to members of the House of Representatives of the 
Legislature of Alabama . . . There shall also be elected ten delegates from 
the State at large . . .”122 
 Petitions, signed by members of the public, were the dominant mode 
of nominating delegates.123 The number of required signatures ranged 
widely. In Tennessee, an aspiring delegate needed to get a mere fifteen 
signatures.124 California, Delaware, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana and Utah 
required 100 names.125 Florida, Indiana, and New Mexico chose 500.126 
Kentucky and Wisconsin chose to require 1,000.127 Ohio selected 5,000;128 
Pennsylvania 10,000.129 And New York sat near the top of the heap by 
requiring 12,000.130 
Four states adopted more calibrated approaches. Maine required the 
                                                 
118 1933 Ill. Laws 12, § 1-2. 
119 1933 Ohio Laws 74, § 4. 
120 Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
121 Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
122 1933 Ala. Laws 77, § 2. 
123 Twenty-five states chose this approach: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
124 1933 Tenn. Laws 53, § 5. 
125 1933 Cal. Laws 598, § 5; 1933 Del. Laws 33, § 5; 1933 Idaho Laws 328, § 5; 1933 
Minn. Laws 272, § 5; 1933 Mont. Laws 458, § 3; 1933 Utah Laws 36, § 5. 
126 1933 Fla. Laws 740, § 4; 1933 Ind. Laws 851, § 5; 1933 N.M. Laws 400, § 6. 
127 1933 Ky. Laws 22, § 4; 1933 Wis. Laws 180, § 4. 
128 1933 Ohio Laws 74, § 5. 
129 1933 Penn. Laws 233, § 5. 
130 1933 N.Y. Laws 525, § 3. 
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“total number of signatures for the nomination of each candidate or 
delegate” to “amount in the aggregate to at least two per cent and not more 
than four per cent of the total vote cast for governor in the election held on 
the 2nd Monday of September, 1932, in the electoral district or division 
within which such candidate is to be voted for, provided, however, that each 
petition must be signed by at least 150 qualified voters.”131 New Jersey 
required 25,000 signatures for a delegate-at-large, and for a district 
delegate, a “petition signed by such registered voters of the county equal to 
at least one-tenth of the vote cast in the preceding general election for 
members of the Assembly in such county,” but not more than 10,000 
signatures.132 North Carolina mandated that each petition be signed by at 
least two percent of the county’s gubernatorial vote.133 South Dakota also 
adopted the two percent approach.134 
 Few states expressly bound their delegates to vote in accordance 
with the election results. Alabama extracted an oath from each delegate “to 
abide by the result of the referendum in the State on the question of the 
ratification or rejection of the proposed Twenty-first Amendment . . .”135 
Arkansas required each delegate to produce “a statement in writing, 
subscribed and sworn to by the candidate as to whether or not said 
individual is ‘For repeal of the 18th Amendment’ or ‘Against the Repeal of 
the 18th Amendment.’”136 Most states, however, contented themselves with 
listing the delegates’ names under ballot headings indicating the delegates’ 
presumed position on the repeal question.137 
 
B.  Popular Votes And Constitutional Conventions 
 
The ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment might be called one 
of the most democratic moments in American history. Over the next eight 
months forty-three states held popular elections and thirty-eight assembled 
conventions. Almost all voters in America had the unprecedented 
opportunity to bless or condemn a federal constitutional amendment 
                                                 
131 1933 Me. Laws 840, § 5. 
132 1933 N.J. Laws 143, § 5. 
133 1933 N.C. Laws 600, § 7. 
134 1933 S.D. Laws 100, § 3. 
135 1933 Ala. Sess. Laws 77, § 6. 
136 1933 Ark. Laws 527, § 3. 
137 See, eg., 1933 Cal. Laws 598, § 6. California listed one slate of delegates under the 
heading: “Against Ratification and Against Repeal” and the other under: “For Ratification 
and for Repeal.”  
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directly. Never before had the nation modified the Constitution in process 
so near to a popular referendum. Millions of women exercised their newly 
guaranteed right to vote. The constitutional conventions ratified the choices 
of the people without fail. 
The results of the popular elections were staggering. Michigan acted 
first. The state’s law, passed on March 11, provided for an election on the 
first Monday in April. Eighty seven of Michigan’s 100 districts had voted to 
repeal the state’s bone dry prohibition law the previous November,138 and 
the Los Angeles Times reported that “opponents of prohibition tonight are 
predicting a decisive pronouncement in Monday’s election in favor of 
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.”139 They were right. Early returns 
from Detroit showed an almost ten to one margin in favor of repeal.140 
Since the elections were by district rather than statewide, anti-repeal 
advocates predicted a strong dry showing in rural areas would threaten the 
repealists’s victory.141 But even Michigan’s rural areas went wet by a 2-1 
margin. “For the state at large, with six sevenths of the more than 1,000,000 
votes tabulated, the total was Wet 754,838; Dry 243,030.”142 The following 
week’s convention would be composed of ninety-nine wet delegates and 
one dry delegate. The dry delegate, from “rural Barry County,” had won his 
seat by a margin of “236 out of 7062 votes cast.”143 The repealists were off 
to a strong start. 
Michigan’s vote triggered a landslide in other states. Keeping with a 
Midwest theme, Wisconsin voted the same week. As in Michigan, 
Wisconsin voters had “repealed the [state] enforcement law four years 
[earlier] with a referendum vote of 350,337 to 196,402.”144 The Wisconsin 
legislature had also chosen to elect delegates from the state at large to the 
                                                 
138 The popular vote in that contest was 1,022,568 to 475,265 in favor of repeal. See 
Approaches November Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1933, at 1. 
139 Interest High in Michigan Vote, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1933, at 2. 
140 Repealist Group Leading in Michigan Returns, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1933, at 1. (“Latest 
figures from Detroit, returns from 100 out of 883 districts for seventeen delegates, showed: 
for repeal, 20,573; against repeal, 2,220.”) 
141 Interest High in Michigan Vote, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1933, at 2. (“Opponents of repeal, 
while making no predictions as to the outcome, have expressed belief that the election of 
delegates by county units will cut materially into the margin repeal proponents have 
claimed.”) 
142 Michigan Wins Single Vote Against Repeal, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 5, 
1933, at 7 
143 Michigan Wins Single Vote Against Repeal, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 5, 
1933, at 7. 
144 Dry Concedes Wisconsin Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1933, at 3. 
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constitutional convention. Disheartened, the Wisconsin chapter of the Anti-
Saloon League conceded defeat even before the election.145 The ensuing 
landslide went even beyond the hopes of the repealists. The day after votes 
were cast, newspapers across the nation trumpeted a 4 to 1 Wisconsin repeal 
margin.146 Fifteen out of fifteen of the delegates to Wisconsin’s 
constitutional convention later that month would vote to repeal the 
Eighteenth Amendment.147 
New Jersey, Wyoming, New York, Nevada, Delaware, and Rhode 
Island voted wet the next month. May 14 saw Wyoming vote in favor of 
repeal 6 to 1.148 On May 16, New Jersey followed suit, voting wet by a 6.6 
to 1 margin.149  On May 23, New York contributed a thunderous eighty-
eight percent vote for repeal, spurred by a heavy wet forty-one to one vote 
in New York City.150 A few days later, Nevada and Delaware rejected the 
Eighteenth Amendment by similarly overwhelming margins.151 And Rhode 
Island, which had never ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, completed the 
May anti-prohibitionist sweep by a tally of more than seven to one.152 
In June, panicked by the overwhelming repeal tide, prohibitionists 
launched “the bitterest fight of their history.” Anti-repealists convened in 
Washington, DC in “an atmosphere redolent of furniture polish and strong 
soap” and predicted that seven of the eight states (all but Illinois) to cast 
                                                 
145 Dry Concedes Wisconsin Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1933, at 3. (“All hope for the dry 
cause in Wisconsin was lost, [the State Superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League] said, 
when the legislature decided that delegates to the April 25 repeal convention at Madison 
should be elected on a strictly non-partisan basis and by voters of the State at large.”) 
146 Repealists Win Wisconsin by Sweeping Vote, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 6, 1933, at 4. 
Milwaukee went 12 to 1 for repeal. Green Bay favored ending prohibition by an 11 to 1 
margin. “In the deluge Rockland Village, in western La Crosse county, stood out in 
curious, dry contrast. It voted to retain the eighteenth amendment by a count of 44 to 38.” 
Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Wyoming Vote Gives Big Lead for Repeal, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1933, at 1. Because 
Wyoming voted by districts, several dozen dry delegates were elected to the convention. Id.  
149 Jersey Drys Get Only Two Delegates, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1933, at 14. All delegates at 
large in New Jersey were wets, and only two of 162 district delegates were drys. Id. 
150 Drys in State Won Only Six Counties, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1933, at 2. The near 
complete tally was 1,885,027 to 227,550. The New York Times attributed the lopsided vote 
partially to light turnout in rural areas. Id. The complete figures put the wets at over two 
million popular votes. State Vote was 88% Wet, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1933, at 12. 
151 Delaware, Nevada Vote Dry Era’s End, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 28, 1933, at 1. 
152 Rhode Island Votes 7 to 1 to Ratify Repeal of Dry Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 2, 1933, 
at 1. Only one town went dry, by a margin of seventeen votes. Id. 
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June votes would affirm the Eighteenth Amendment.153 But despite 
vigorous dry efforts, all eight June voting states rejected the Eighteenth 
Amendment. On June 4, Illinois became the ninth state to vote for repeal, 
racking up majorities of nearly 11 to 1 in wet Chicago.154 In Indiana, which 
drys had declared the first real battleground of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, wets won 2 to 1.155 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New 
Hampshire, and West Virginia voters voiced their resounding support for 
the Twenty-first Amendment.156 Despite a court challenge to the validity of 
their election,157 California voters rejected the Eighteenth Amendment on 
June 27.158 By the end of June states with a population of over fifty-two 
million had voted on the repeal question, and the tally stood at sixteen states 
for repeal, zero against.159 
Three southern states and Oregon voted in July. Prohibitionists had 
expected a strong showing in the traditionally dry South, but were again 
disappointed. Alabama and Arkansas voted overwhelmingly wet on July 
18.160 Tennessee became the third southern state to disapprove of 
Prohibition on July 20, but the scant majority for repeal “gave the drys the 
satisfaction of the closest fight in any State since repeal voting started.”161 
Oregon’s July 21 vote brought the score to twenty states for repeal, zero 
against.162 By the end of July, the newly wet states accounted for half the 
                                                 
153 Drys Will Launch Bitterest Crusade, WASH. POST, June 5, 1933, at 2. 
154 Repealists Add Illinois to Column, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1933, at 1. 
155 Indiana, Pivot State, Tenth to Vote Repeal, WASH. POST, June 7, 1933, at 1. The New 
York Times emphasized the significance of the Indiana vote. “No other State has been more 
insistently or belligerently dry,” the Times editorialized. “Where will the prohibitionists 
find their thirteen States? It is impossible to name them.” Repeal Rolling On, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 1933, at 18. 
156 See Bay State for Repeal Four to One, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1933, at 1; Repeal Tests 
Slated Today, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1933, at 3; Iowa Votes for Dry Repeal, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut Also Wet, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 21, 1933, at 1. 
157 See Frederick F. Forbes, Court Fight Fails California Drys, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1933, 
at E8. 
158 Repeal Wins More States, California, West Virginia Join Fourteen, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
June 28, 1933, at 1. 
159 The Repeal Campaign, WASH. POST, June 3, 1933, at 6. 
160 Crucial Vote in South, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1933, at 1. The tally was 3 to 2 in Alabama 
and Arkansas. See Alabama, Arkansas Vote Three to Two for Repeal, ATL. CONST., July 
19, 1933, at 1. 
161 Tennessee Votes Wet: Repeal Election Close, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1933, at 1. (“With 
1892 of the State’s 2172 precincts reported, the vote for repeal was 120,197 against, 
110,444 for retention of the Eighteenth Amendment.”) The city of Memphis provided the 
necessary margin for repeal. Id. 
162 Oregon is 20th State to Join Repeal Parade, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 22, 1933, at 1. 
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U.S. population.163 
August saw another wet landslide. Prohibitionists conceded Arizona 
before voting began, failing to nominate a single dry delegate.164 Arizona 
drys were forced to “write in” their candidates.165 On August 19 Missouri 
voted against the Eighteenth Amendment by a 4 to 1 margin, with even 
“formerly dry strongholds” in the Ozarks “rolling up wet majorities.”166 
Several days later Texas recorded a massive pro-repeal majority. Wets 
began talking of repeal by Christmas.167 Drys mistakenly predicted a 
“surprise” in Washington; the state went wet by a 3 to 1 margin.168 By the 
end of August, 24 states had expressed their preference for repeal. Dry 
leaders, shell shocked by the strength of the repeal sentiment, blamed 
political and economic “coercion” from the federal government for the loss 
of five formerly dry strongholds.169 The Republican Party was stricken with 
internal strife as leaders blamed one another for the wet landslide.170 
By September the result was foreordained. Though the Anti-Saloon 
League promised in each state left to vote “an aggressive and 
uncompromising campaign of organization and agitation to defeat repeal 
and record the largest vote possible against it,”171 wets continued to record 
victories. The next four weeks saw seven more states add to the repeal slate. 
In the Northeast, Vermont and Maine (the nation’s first dry state) rejected 
the Eighteenth Amendment 2 to 1.172  In the West, Colorado, Idaho, and 
                                                                                                                            
Oregon voters simultaneously repealed their state’s dry law. Id. 
163 Arthur Evans, Voting Lineup Points to Repeal About Dec. 6th, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 
23, 1933, at 8. 
164 Arizona Votes Repeal Today; No Dry Ticket, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 8, 1933, at 2. 
165 Id. Arizona went wet by a margin of 3 to 1. See Arizona Wets Ahead, 3 to 1, In Repeal 
Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1933, at 1. 
166 Missouri Votes Wet; 4 to 1, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 20, 1933, at 1.  
167 Texas Results Spur Wet Hope, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1933, at 3. 
168 Repeal is Close in Washington: Wets Forecast 2-1 Win as Dry Forces Forecast Surprise 
in Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1933, at 3. 
169 Drys to Defeat Repeal, Says McBride Here, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 31, 1933, at 5. “Dr. 
McBride blamed the sweeping victories thus far rolled up by the wets in all the states 
voting to ratify the repeal amendment upon ‘political coercion on the part of the 
administration, which has sought to make this an economic rather than a moral 
question.’”). 
170 Koenig Ridicules Mellen’s Attack: Republican Leader Says Foe Blames Him for 
National Democratic Landslide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1933, at 27.  
171 Dry Conference Adopts Plan to Fight Repeal: Will Invade All 24 States Remaining to 
Vote, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 1, 1933, at 10.  
172 Vermont Votes, 2 to 1, Against Prohibition, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 6, 
1933, at 3; Maine Wet After 82 Years, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 12, 1933, at 1. 
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New Mexico voted wet by similarly large margins.173 Maryland and 
Minnesota followed suit.174 By the end of September, drys had yet to boast 
a single victory. Wets began talking of the possibility of unanimous 
ratification.175 
Virginia voted wet in a tidal wave on October 3, and drys finally 
began facing the reality of repeal.176 With only four more states necessary to 
guarantee repeal, a Virginia dry leader “issued a statement, saying that the 
‘situation as it is developing nationally is deplorable.’ Terming the liquor 
traffic ‘one of the arch criminals of all time,’ he said that ‘no nation is safe 
from its ravages until it is outlawed.’”177  The drys’ appeals were to no 
avail, as the wets completed a clean sweep. “Though Florida prohibitionists 
. . . made final appeals through churches for a heavy vote . . . against 
repeal,”178 that state voted for repeal 4 to 1 on October 10.179 Finally, on 
November 7, Utah, Ohio, and Pennsylvania sealed the fate of the Eighteenth 
Amendment.180 Only two states, North Carolina and South Carolina, went 
dry.181 An overwhelming majority of Americans, in an extraordinarily 
democratic set of popular elections, had completed an astounding and 
unprecedented reversal of a constitutional amendment. 
Marching in lockstep with the voting over the summer and fall of 
1933 were the state conventions. In many cases, the conventions occurred 
only a few days after vote tallies had been completed. Michigan, for 
example, earned the double honor of being the first state to vote wet and the 
first to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment by holding its convention a mere 
week after the popular vote.182 Most other states ratified a few weeks or 
months later. 
The conventions served only to rubber-stamp the results of the 
popular vote. No deep deliberations occurred. In part, this was due to the 
                                                 
173 Drys Concede Defeats In Three More States, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 14, 1933, at 13. 
174 Id.; Minnesota Joins March, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1933, at 2. 
175 Will Repeal Be Unanimous?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1933, at 20. 
176 Virginians Vote Wet, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1933, at 1. 
177 Id. 
178 Florida Drys Plead Cause From Pulpits, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1933, at 12. 
179 Repealists Carry Florida, 33d State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1933, at 1. 
180 Repeal Winning Thirty-Sixth State, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1933, at 1. 
181 Both Carolinas Are Won By Drys, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1933, at 1. Since North Carolina 
did not hold a constitutional convention, the conventional tally counts only South Carolina 
as recording a dry vote. North Carolina, however, voted dry by a substantially higher 
margin (around 100,000 votes) than South Carolina (around 3,000 votes).   
182 See 1933 Mich. Laws 24, § 8. 
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overwhelming victories of the repealists; few dry delegates attended the 
conventions. A speaker at the Virginia convention noted that “conventions 
ordinarily are deliberative bodies, but no deliberation is necessary where the 
people have spoken in plain and decisive manner on a public question, fully 
understood by every intelligent voter.”183 The lack of debate troubled 
Americans in Maine, who asked the state Supreme Judicial Court to issue 
an advisory opinion answering the question: “Must a convention assembling 
in a state to pass upon an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and submitted by vote of the Congress to the action of conventions in 
the several states be a deliberative convention?” The Maine court concluded 
that “[a] convention is a body or assembly representative of all the people of 
the state. The convention must be free to exercise the essential and 
characteristic function of rational deliberation.” The Alabama Supreme 
Court took the opposite view.184  
Despite the debate in the courts, only the Indiana convention came 
close to a truly deliberative convention. In that state, the dry delegates 
argued that the Depression had gotten the better of Americans’ judgment: 
“The vote . . . has been taken in a time of dire economic distress when the 
governments of state and nation have been searching for every possible 
revenue, when men and women have been trying to find relief from acute 
conditions of unemployment and from business and industrial stagnation . . 
.”185 The dissenters rejected the Twenty-first Amendment because it 
“provides absolutely no guaranty against the return of the saloon . . . 
relinquishes the right of the Federal Government to control the traffic at the 
very time when all other forms of industry are coming under national 
control . . . [and] implies legalization of liquor advertising by press, bill-
board, radio and screen.”186 Wet delegates made their own arguments.187 
Some conventions opened with a prayer.188 Usually, the governor of 
                                                 
183 Va. Const. Conv. (statement of Pres. Goolrick), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 439. 
184 See Everett S. Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, 29 AM. POLI. 
SCI. REV. 1005, 1014 (1935). 
185 Ind. Const. Conv. (statement of Jesse E. Eschbach), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 144. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 141-44. 
188 See, eg., Rhode Island Const. Conv. (statement of Rev. Peter E. Blessing), in BROWN, 
supra note 103, at 359-60; Utah Const. Conv. (statement of Dr. Elmer I. Goshen), in 
BROWN, supra note 103, at 394-95 (“Almighty God, surrounded by the wonders of Thy 
works and the glories of Thy universe, of which we have been made a part, may we have 
grateful hearts, a reverent attitude and understanding minds as representatives of a 
sovereign state engaged in the protection of our sister states.”). 
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the state or a wet luminary would then address the delegates.189 The 
speeches often rehashed the miserable history of Prohibition as well as the 
personal liberty the Twenty-first Amendment would restore.190 The 
delegates would then vote on a chairman and perhaps an honorary chairman 
of the convention.191 Afterwards, a roll call vote would be taken, and the 
results transmitted to the United States Secretary of State.192 The process 
was usually exceptionally brief. The entire transcript of one state’s 
ratification proceedings spans only a page and a half.193 Another time, a 
delegate short circuited what could have been a needlessly protracted 
ratification process.194 Aside from a few speeches, little discussion of the 
Amendment’s purposes occurred during the conventions. 
Still, isolated statements in the convention speeches illuminate some 
views on the new role of the states in liquor control. Governor Wilbur L. 
Cross of Connecticut said that Section 2 of the Amendment would restore 
“to the several States of the Union full control within their borders of the 
manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors.”195 The Delaware Convention 
wished “to go on record . . . in so ratifying a resolution to abolish Federal 
Prohibition and return to the States their former power to control the 
manufacture, transportation and sale of alcoholic liquors within their own 
borders.”196 And the Governor of Missouri urged the passage of laws so 
“that the people may be protected from the evils of hard liquor.”197 No 
speaker at any convention, however, spoke precisely about the scope of the 
states’ powers under Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
What accounts for such a rapid change in public opinion on a social 
                                                 
189 See, eg., Ohio Const. Conv. (statement of Gov. White), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 
322; Ind. Const. Conv. (statement of Lt. Gov.). 
190 See, eg., N.J. Const. Conv. (statement of Emerson L. Richards), in BROWN, supra note 
103, at 280-81 (“Laws governing the people have no place in [the Constitution] . . . [T]he 
evils brought about by the Eighteenth Amendment were too many to recite here . . .”). 
191 See, eg., N.Y. Const. Conv. , in BROWN, supra note 103, at 301. 
192 See, eg., Ohio Const. Conv. (statement of Sen. Bulkley), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 
332-33. 
193 See N.M. Const. Conv., in BROWN, supra note 103, at 290-91. 
194 See Mass. Const. Conv. (statement of Charles F. Ely), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 211 
(“I do not see why we cannot simply vote, and call it a day. It is a long way from Westfield 
down here, and we had breakfast quite early. We all know for what we were elected, and I 
don’t believe but what Mr. Cook can count the ballots correctly, and I don’t see why we 
cannot vote without a lot of committees.”) 
195 Conn. Const. Conv. (statement of Gov. Cross), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 60. 
196 Del Const. Conv. in BROWN, supra note 104, at 66. 
197 Mo. Const. Conv. (statement of Gov. Park), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 251-52. 
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experiment that had been widely supported just fourteen years earlier? The 
conventional answer is that Prohibition had been a practical failure. Much 
evidence supports this view.198 Mentioned less often, however, is the impact 
of the Great Depression on the fortunes of the wets. The economic crisis of 
the late ’20s and early ’30s eviscerated the nation’s income tax base. By 
1932 and 1933, the federal treasury had bottomed out. Total receipts in 
those two years totaled about $1.9 billion and $2 billion, or less than one 
third of federal receipts in 1920.199 Due to the New Deal, federal deficits, at 
about $2.6 billion, were at their highest level in over a decade.200 As a 
result, new levies had to be imposed. The taxation of alcohol, which had 
been a massive source of federal revenue before Prohibition, was to 
millions of distressed Americans a suitable replacement for billions of 
upcoming direct taxes. Moreover, repealists were convinced that a 
rejuvenated liquor industry would offer jobs to many of the millions of 
unemployed. 
Newspapers at the time were ablaze with discussion of liquor tax 
revenue possibilities. Before Congress acted on the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment stressed 
the value of alcohol taxes: “Favorable action by this Congress will enable 
the next Congress to lift from the shoulders of the people the new billion-
dollar tax burden which is now about to be put on us.”201 In December 1932 
the chairwoman of the Women’s Organization for National Prohibition 
Reform made the same argument: “The legalization and taxation of light 
wines and beers alone would do more to balance the budget than all the 
nuisance taxes that have been proposed . . . Why should we not collect a 
revenue of more than $300,000,000 from an industry that can bear it, and to 
that extent relieve the business man who is fighting for his financial life 
against the present economic condition?”202 The federal Budget Director 
estimated that “in normal times, beer revenue will reach $200,000,000 and 
revenue from liquors from $250,000,000 to $300,000,000.”203 Drys who 
would otherwise have voted wet were said “to be supporting repeal on 
economic grounds, believing that with the return of liquor, Federal, State, 
                                                 
198 See, eg., Post, supra note 23. 
199 See Historical Tables, Office of Management & Budget 25, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
200 Id. 
201 House Votes Today on Liquor Control, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1932, at 2. 
202 Women Urge Haste in Legalizing Beer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1932, at 44. 
203 Repeal in 1933 in Prospect, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1933, at 12. 
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and local taxes will greatly be reduced.”204 
 
IV. PICKING UP THE PIECES: LIQUOR LAWS AFTER REPEAL 
 
After repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, states moved quickly to 
create or adjust their own liquor laws. The twin goals were to prevent liquor 
abuse and to stuff state treasuries with badly needed liquor tax revenues. By 
1940 eighteen states had adopted monopoly systems, allowing only state 
run liquor stores to sell distilled spirits, beer, or wine.205 “Twenty-Seven 
states provide[d] for control through licensing only . . .” And “three States, 
while authorizing light wines, or beer, . . . retained the major portion of their 
prohibition laws.”206 
Most states adopted licensing systems designed to raise revenue. 
South Carolina (which, ironically, had been the only state to affirm via 
convention its commitment to the Eighteenth Amendment) enacted a typical 
licensing law. A State Tax Commission would oversee administration and 
enforcement. Distillers, bottlers, and warehousemen faced stringent 
regulations. They were required to get a $2,000 license from the Tax 
Commission and pay another $2,000 bond before opening for business. 
They were prohibited from operating more than one “plant” in each county. 
And they could sell only to wholesalers. Wholesalers, in turn, faced a 
$2,000 license fee and a $2,000 bond for hard liquor, and a $200 permit for 
malt beverages under 5% alcohol. Finally, brewers were required to pay a 
$100 license fee in order to produce beer with an alcohol content of 5% or 
lower.207 Twenty-two other states and the District of Columbia adopted 
similar licensing schemes.208 
Other states established full or partial monopoly systems. The 
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typical monopoly system functioned via a system of state run stores 
supplied by licensed manufacturers. The state would establish a liquor 
control board with the authority to issue rules and regulations, “[e]xclusive 
power to import, purchase for resale, alcohol, spirits and wine, establish 
stores and special distributors, lease buildings, issue licenses for 
manufacture, sale and purchase.” Profits from state run were deposited into 
the state treasury.209 About seventeen states adopted variations on this basic 
system.210 
Three states chose to stay dry. Why did more states not choose this 
route? After all, twenty-six states had enacted dry laws by April 1917. Why 
did the nation not return to the pre-Prohibition patchwork of wet and dry 
states? Several forces played important roles. First, the state dry laws of 
1917 and 1918 bore little resemblance to the drastic bone dry prohibition of 
the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. In 1918 only eleven 
states – Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah – banned 
without exception the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating 
liquors.211 The laws of the rest of the dry states were riddled with 
exceptions. Georgia allowed “social service of liquor in private homes.”212 
Twelve others allowed the importation of liquor from out of state for 
“personal use” (although some of these twelve restricted the amounts).213 
Others allowed the personal manufacture of liquor.214 As Robert Post notes, 
the modest character of these laws generated widespread public 
acceptance.215 It was not until the Reed Amendment of 1917,216 which 
forbade the importation of alcohol into dry states, the Eighteenth 
Amendment, and the Volstead Act, that the nation became bone dry.217 And 
it was the radical centralizing approach of the Eighteenth Amendment, not 
the more reserved stance of the various state prohibition laws of 1917 that 
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triggered widespread public resentment and disobedience.218 After 
Prohibition’s repeal, most of America embraced modest, pre-Eighteenth 
Amendment liquor regulations. 
Second, states were strapped for tax revenue. As state after state 
voted to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment, state leaders began discussing 
the possibility of filling their coffers with taxes on liquor. By August 1933, 
the governor of Iowa had already “announced a [legislative] session to 
consider liquor control, tax revision, and governmental reorganization.”219 
Wets in Kansas complained that prohibition was costing the state 
$5,000,000 per year.220 In mid August, New York, anticipating a wet 
Christmas, passed a slate of liquor taxes that would go into effect when 
Prohibition met its end.221 The state also passed a slew of heavy licensing 
fees, including a $15,000 annual fee for distillers.222 A few days later, 
Virginia passed its own set of taxes.223 
Third, many state legislatures had been reapportioned, giving wets 
political strength more proportionate to their numbers. Reapportionment 
activities in Congress and the states had been at a standstill from 1910 to 
1930. In state legislatures, drys were represented far in excess of their 
numbers. In 1930, however, Congress was substantially reapportioned, and 
the states, most of which had state constitutions requiring reapportionment 
after each federal census, were as well.224 Many newly elected state 
legislators hailed from urban, wet-friendly areas. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A legal history of the Twenty-first Amendment resurrects many 
issues and questions that may reoccur in the future. A future Congress, 
proposing a constitutional amendment, may reexamine Article V’s option of 
ratification by convention. If so, Judge Clark’s endorsement of the 
convention method in United States v. Sprague for constitutional 
amendments directly modifying the rights of the people, even if not 
supportable in a constitutional sense, may yet prove politically influential. If 
Congress does choose to submit a new constitutional amendment to 
conventions, it will confront precisely the questions that bedeviled the 
legislators of 1933: does Congress have the power to prescribe directly the 
form and procedures of state constitutional conventions? If a state 
legislature failed to act, could the people of a state call an “extra-legal” 
constitutional convention? Although this issue did not generate a 
confrontation in the early 1930s, it has explosive potential, especially if 
several state legislatures, captured by special interests, refused to call a 
convention on an otherwise popular constitutional amendment. Recall New 
Mexico’s 1933 law, which promised “to resist to the utmost any attempt to 
execute any and all such congressional dictation and usurpation.”225 
The legal history of the Twenty-first Amendment also sheds light on 
the post-repeal powers of the states to regulate liquor – an issue that arises 
often nowadays.226 To be sure, the isolated statements in the 1933 
Congressional Record, the popular debates, and the constitutional 
conventions say little about the purposes of Section 2. But a broader 
approach sweeps in the statutory predecessors to Section 2: the Wilson Act 
and the Webb-Kenyon Act. When added to the history of state dry laws in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Webb-Kenyon story 
makes clear that the framers of the Twenty-first Amendment did not intend 
to endorse discrimination against interstate commerce. Section 2 was to be 
interpreted in light of other constitutional provisions. 
Most importantly, examining the legal history of the Twenty-first 
Amendment is a window to one of America’s most democratic moments. 
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Avoiding the possibility “that self-dealing state legislatures might thwart 
needed reforms,”227 America chose the convention route. Dozens of state 
legislatures passed laws providing for dozens of popular votes on a 
constitutional amendment for the first time since the Founding. The 
conventions rubber-stamped the choice of the people. The Eighteenth 
Amendment restricted the personal liberty of the people; it was fittingly 
repealed by the people. 
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